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Abstract— In service based applications, it is often necessary to 
construct compositions of services in order to provide required 
functionality in cases where this is not possible through the use of 
a single service. Whilst creating service compositions, it is 
necessary to ensure not only that the functionality required of the 
composition is achieved but also that certain security properties 
are preserved. In this paper, we describe an approach to 
constructing secure service compositions. Our approach is based 
on the use of composition patterns and rules that determine the 
security properties that should be preserved by the individual 
services that constitute a composition in order to ensure that 
security properties of the overall composition are also satisfied. 
Our approach extends a framework developed to support the 
runtime service discovery. 
Software service security; secure service composition 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The problem of constructing service compositions has 
received considerable attention in the literature (e.g. 
[25][26][27]). This is because service composition is necessary 
when a functionality required by a service based application 
(SBA) cannot be provided by any single service. 
Existing approaches focus on the generation of compositions 
that provide required functional and quality of service 
properties, and/or on checks of the compatibility of the 
behavioural models of services that are to be composed. The 
satisfaction of required functional and QoS properties are 
necessary conditions for generating usable service 
compositions. However, they are not sufficient when a service 
composition needs also to satisfy given security properties. 
Addressing security properties in service composition has not 
received significant attention in the literature and – to the best 
of our knowledge – existing work (e.g., [9][10]) does not offer 
adequate solutions to this problem. To address this gap, in this 
paper, we describe our approach to constructing secure service 
compositions. 
Our approach is based on the use of composition patterns 
and security implication rules to determine which security 
properties the individual services that constitute a composition 
should have in order to ensure that security properties required 
of the overall composition are satisfied. More specifically, the 
composition patterns provide abstract and parametric 
specifications of service workflows. Pattern specifications 
describe the flows of control and data within a workflow and 
preconditions determining when a pattern can be applied. The 
security rules express the consequences that, particular actions 
of individual services and service compositions, have on 
security properties. For example, one of the rules used in our 
approach expresses that if the confidentiality of the inputs to a 
given activity in a workflow must be preserved and this 
activity is bound to a service that produces an output 
containing information about the input, the confidentiality of 
the service output must also be preserved.  The security rules 
express formally proven relations between security properties.  
During the composition process, the security rules are used 
to determine the security properties that need to be satisfied by 
individual services, in order to guarantee the security 
properties required of the entire composition. The security 
properties identified for individual services are fed into a 
discovery tool, which subsequently finds suitable candidate 
services for the composition.  
Our approach extends a discovery framework that has been 
developed at City University to support the discovery of 
services at runtime [16]. Originally, this framework supported 
the discovery of single services based on criteria regarding the 
interface, behaviour and quality of services, in a reactive or a 
proactive mode, i.e., when a need for finding a service at arises 
(reactive mode) or continually in order to maintain up-to-date 
sets of candidate services that could be used to replace the 
constituent services of an SBA when any of these services fails 
(proactive mode). The work that we describe in this paper 
extends the capabilities of this framework by enabling the 
construction of secure service compositions.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II 
outlines a scenario for service composition, which is used in 
the rest of the paper to exemplify our approach. Section III 
gives an overview of the overall service discovery framework 
within which our approach is used. Section IV and V describe 
the composition patterns and the security reasoning rules 
underpinning our approach, respectively. Section VI describes 
the service composition algorithm and gives an example of 
applying it. Finally, Section VII overviews related work and 
Section VIII provides some summarising remarks and outlines 
directions for future work. 
 II. SCENARIO 
A scenario that we use in the rest of the paper to exemplify 
our approach involves a financial market SBA offered by a 
stockbroker to stock investors wishing to buy and/or sell stocks 
in different stock exchanges. Stock investors don’t have direct 
access to exchanges and must rely on stockbrokers for carrying 
trades. The stockbroker’s SBA provides a set of useful 
operations to stock investors to enable trades. Some of these 
operations are based on services available from third party 
service providers (e.g., provision of financial data to enable 
trading decisions). As some of these operations might become 
unavailable at runtime, however, the stockbroker’s SBA 
should incorporate mechanisms for searching and replacing 
such services and operations, if the need arises at runtime. 
Suppose, for example, that the stockbroker SBA uses an 
operation called getStockHeadlines provided by a third-party 
service S1. Given a stock symbol (Symbol) and some customer 
details (CustData) as inputs, this operation returns a set of 
recent news related to the identified stock and uses the 
customer details to get paid for the offered service. The output 
of getStockHeadlines is an array of StockNews, containing the 
headline, time and source of each news item about the input 
stock. The required security conditions for this service are that 
CustData and Symbol should be confidential during the 
transmission, to avoid external parties seeing who is requesting 
information about particular stocks and the credentials used for 
news payments. 
When S1 becomes unavailable, the stockbroker SBA must 
look for replacement services for it. If these are no such 
individual services, an alternative could be to use the 
composition C shown in Fig. 1. This composition uses service 
S2 that provides a different operation to retrieve stock news, 
called fetchNewsHeadlines. This operation returns an array of 
MarketNews containing all the financial news, indexed by a 
stock’s ISIN (i.e., a different ID from Symbol), after receiving 
proof of prior payment by the requesting party (PaymToken). 
In fact, to be able to use an operation of S2, a customer must 
first pay through the operation Payment. This operation is 
offered by S2 and generates a PaymToken (output) from 
CustData (input) after a payment has been made. 
The output MarketNews must, then, be filtered through the 
Stock ID. For this reason the composition includes also a 
getStockDetails operation that returns a StockMap, containing 
the ISIN corresponding to Symbol. 
 
getStock 
Details 
+" +"
fetchNews 
Headlines Payment 
I: Symbol* 
Symbol* 
CustData* MarketNews[]* 
O: StockDetails* 
O: MarketNews[] 
MarketNews = <Headline, Time, Source, ISIN> 
StockDetails = <CIK, CUSIP, ISIN, Name, Market, Category> 
I: CustData* 
O: PaymToken* 
I: PaymToken* 
 
Fig. 1. Composition C – Data marked with (*) should be confidential 
The composition of Fig. 1 creates requirements for new 
security properties that arise from the original security 
conditions. In particular, since CustData must be confidential, 
then its related payment token, PaymToken, must also be 
confidential. Furthermore, to guarantee that Symbol remains 
confidential, StockMap (and ISIN) should be confidential as 
well, since they can also provide the same information about 
the stock that the investor. Furthermore, the filtered news 
should be pruned of the ISIN information, or the ISIN should 
be confidential. 
III. DISCOVERY FRAMEWORK 
A. Overall Architecture 
Our approach to secure service composition is part of the 
discovery framework shown in Fig. 2. This framework accepts 
service discovery queries from SBAs, and finds services in 
external service registries that satisfy the conditions of the 
queries. Queries can be submitted for execution in reactive 
(PULL) or proactive (PUSH) mode. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Discovery Framework 
 
The framework includes a Discovery Engine that is 
responsible for the retrieving individual service descriptions 
data from external service registries and matching them with 
the queries. It also includes Registry Watchers which poll 
external registries periodically to check if there are new 
services or amended service descriptions that would alter the 
candidate sets of services that are maintained for queries 
executed in proactive mode. The new component of the 
framework that is based on the work of this paper is the 
Composition Manager. This component is responsible for the 
creation of secure service compositions to meet queries in 
cases where the latter do not match with any single service. 
B. Discovery process 
The overall discovery process realised by the discovery 
framework is shown in Fig. 3. The discovery process starts 
when the Discovery Engine receives a query that should be 
used for discovering replacement services for one of the 
partner services of an SBA. Queries are expressed in an XML 
based language, called A-SerDiQueL. Following the parsing of 
a query, the parts of it that refer to security related discovery 
criteria (referred to as Ce query in Fig. 3) are separated from 
the parts referring to other functional and quality discovery 
criteria (referred to as N query in the figure). This distinction is 
 necessary as the part of the query that refers to security related 
discovery criteria is used in order to identify the composition 
patterns that could be applied in identifying service 
compositions that can ensure these criteria (cf. the activity 
Identify CPatterns in the process). 
Subsequently, the N query and the composition patterns are 
either sent to the discovery engine for an one-off execution (if 
the execution mode of the query is PULL) or are subscribed to 
it, for continual executions if the execution mode of the query 
is PUSH. In PUSH mode, multiple executions may be 
triggered by changes in the descriptions of services already 
identified as possible matches with a query or due to the 
emergence of new services in registries fitting with the query.  
In both the PUSH and the PULL mode of query execution, 
the discovery engine executes the received query at least once 
and returns any services and service compositions that match 
the discovery criteria of the query (see the activity Execute N-
Query/Cpatterns). Any services and/or service compositions 
that match with the discovery criteria of the query at this stage 
are used to update a Candidate Service Set. This set is used as 
a cache of replacement services for the partner service that was 
associated with the query in the first place and any subsequent 
service replacement request will retrieve the first service from 
this set. In the case of candidate service compositions, the 
framework generates a virtual service pointer that can be used 
by the SBA to invoke the composition through the framework. 
It should also be noted that the initial formation of the 
Candidate Service Set is followed by ordering the elements of 
this set in descending order of the degree of match that they 
have with these criteria (see the activity OrderRS wrt Ce). 
Following this stage in the overall process, any candidate 
service/service composition that does satisfy the security 
related criteria is removed from the Candidate Service Set and 
a new discovery process is initiated in order to try to identify 
further services that could meet first the non security criteria of 
the query and then the security related criteria. The reason for 
re-attempting to find services/service compositions meeting the 
criteria of the query is because there is a possibility that new 
services might have been published in the service registry 
meanwhile.  
Certain parts of the overall discovery process described in 
Fig. 3 can be also triggered by events other than a request for 
the execution of a query. These events are: 
• service replacement requests resulting in removal of the 
first service in the Candidate Service Set in order to use it 
in the SBA; 
• publications of new security descriptions (expressed by 
certificates as we explain in Sect. III.C) for one of the 
services in the candidate service set that should trigger the 
re-evaluation of the security related criteria for a candidate 
set that has been built for a query executed in PUSH mode 
and possibly a re-ordering of this set; and 
• changes in the descriptions of services in the service 
registries or the publication of new services in them that 
can lead to the execution of the non security related parts of 
queries executed in the PUSH mode in the first place and 
potentially the re-execution of the security related parts if 
the candidate services set of the query would need to be 
altered given the results produced by the non security 
related part of the query.  
C. Query language 
The queries of the discovery framework are expressed in A-
SerDiQueL, an XML-based language that allows the 
specification of interface, behavioural, QoS and security 
conditions about the services to be discovered. A-SerDiQueL is 
an extension of SerDiQueL (see [24] for a detailed account) 
that we have developed to support the specification of security 
conditions as part of service discovery queries.  
The specification of security conditions in A-SerDiQueL 
assumes that the security properties of services are described 
by security certificates, called asserts. An assert certificate 
certifies that a given security property is preserved by a 
service. In addition to specifying the relevant security property, 
certificates may include descriptions of the evidence justifying 
the certification of the property, the authority that has issued 
the certificate, and the validity period of the certificate.  
 
 
Fig. 3.  Overall Discovery Process 
 TABLE I 
A-SERDIQUEL QUERY EXPRESSING A CONFIDENTIALITY CONDITION 
<AssertQuery	  name="A1"	  type="HARD">	  
	  	  <LogicalExpression>	  
	  	  	  	  <Condition	  relation="EQUAL-­‐TO">	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  <Operand1>	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <AssertOperand	  facetName="Assert"	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  facetType="Assert">	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  //AbstractASSERTStructure/Property	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <AssertOperand>	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  </Operand1>	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  <Operand2>	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <Constant	  type="STRING">	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Confidentiality(O,	  X)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  </Constant>	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  </Operand2>	  
	  	  	  	  </Condition>	  
	  	  </LogicalExpression>	  
</AssertQuery>	  
 
 
Certificates are represented in XML according to a specific 
XML schema, and are published in service registries as a 
special facet of service descriptions. An example of an A-
SerDiQueL query regarding the confidentiality of the input X 
of an operation O of a service S is shown in Table I. 
IV. SECURE COMPOSITION PATTERNS  
Our approach to constructing secure compositions of 
services is driven by secure composition patterns. A secure 
composition pattern is a template specifying a service 
orchestration workflow with activities that can be bound to 
concrete service operations. Patterns describe the control and 
data flows connecting the activities. For each activity 
placeholder in a pattern, it  is possible to automatically build a 
service discovery query in order to find a service operation to 
instantiate the activity. An example of a simple workflow is 
the one obtained by invoking sequences of services in a chain 
to transform an initial input into a required final output [1][2]. 
Two examples of secure composition patterns are provided 
in Fig. 4. The first one is the Secure Sequence Pattern (SSP). 
This pattern represents an elementary control flow with two 
activities, A and B, that must be executed one after the other in 
this specific order (the order of A and B is represented as a 
solid arrow in the picture). The data flow of this pattern is 
summarized in the IO dependencies of the pattern: the input 
passed to A (inA) must be a subset of the available input (IN) 
described in the query, the input to B (inB) should be a subset 
of IN together with the output of the first activity (IN + outA) 
and the final output (OUT) should be a subset of the output of 
B (outB). Note that this is just one of the possible data flows for 
this workflow; another one can require that the final output 
should be a subset of the output of A and B. To represent 
alternative data flows in this case, another variant of the SSP 
pattern with the same control flow but different data flows 
would be required in our approach.  
The second example is the Secure Parallel Filter Pattern 
(SPFP). This pattern specifies the execution of two activities, 
A and B, in parallel, and filters their outputs by an attribute 
value. The data flows of the pattern in Fig. 4 specify that the 
output of A (outA) should be a list of some data type TypeX that 
is to be filtered and B should return as output (outB) the value 
used to filter through an attribute of TypeX. The final output of 
the pattern (OUT) is then filtered from these two outputs by an 
internal activity (filter) which is part of the pattern. 
 
SECURE SEQUENCE PATTERN 
<A> <B> 
inA 
inB 
outA outB 
IN 
OUT 
 
 
IO DEPENDENCIES FOR A 
inA ⊆ IN 
IO DEPENDENCIES FOR B 
inB ⊆ IN+outA  
IO DEP. FOR THE REPLY 
OUT ⊆ outB 
 
SECURE PARALLEL FILTER 
PATTERN 
 
+" +" OUT 
<A> 
<B> 
inA 
inB 
outA 
outB 
IN filter 
 
 
IO DEPENDENCIES FOR A 
inA ⊆ IN 
outA isCollectionOf TypeX 
IO DEPENDENCIES FOR B 
inB ⊆ IN 
outB isAttributeOf TypeX 
IO DEP. FOR THE REPLY 
OUT ⊆ filter(outA, outB) 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Examples of secure composition patterns 
The composition patterns are expressed internally in OWL-
S [20]. Our pattern representation schema uses the Process 
Model portion of OWL-S that allows to specify service 
Inputs/Outputs, preconditions and results, as well as 
compositions of services. Each pattern is described as a 
CompositeProcess, and contains: (a) control flows 
expressed by ControlConstructs (e.g. Sequence, Split-­‐
Join, Choice) that contain activity Perform elements, and (b) 
data flows specified as Bindings between variables of 
different activities. Note that in our specification if a Binding 
has a variable X in the toVar element and a variable Y in the 
valueSource/ValueOf, it implies that X is a subset of Y (X 
⊆ Y)  unlike standard OWL-S which assumes that X = Y). 
Table II shows the specification of the SPFP pattern in 
OWL-S. This specification describes the control flow of the 
two activities (rows 18-27 for A and 28-37 for B) through the 
Split-­‐Join element (rows 17-38) and the dependencies on 
the inputs of A (rows 20-26) and B (rows 30-36). Furthermore, 
it describes the final output OUT (i.e. ProcessOutput in row 
6) as a subset of the output of a BasicFilter activity (rows 
7-10). This activity is part of an internal library of available 
data transformation services (or aggregators). These data 
transformation services are basic pieces of code that are called 
from a pattern as a form of data mediation. Since web services 
data is transmitted in XML, a data transformation service can 
usually be encoded in few XSLT lines, with some placeholders 
that will be instantiated during the pattern instantiation. 
Table III shows the encoding of the BasicFilter used in 
the SPFP pattern. This is based on the XSLT identity transform 
[22], and it is applied on the TypeX list to filter it. In particular 
during the instantiation of the pattern, the $basicType in the 
filter is instantiated to TypeX element name, $attribute to 
the attribute path and $valueToFilter to a parameter that 
receives the value from the ValueToFilter in the pattern. In 
 particular in the SPFP pattern the ValueToFilter is obtained 
from outB, but it is also possible to use the BasicFilter in 
different patterns with other mappings. 
TABLE II 
SECURE PARALLEL FILTER PATTERN SNIPPET 
1 <p:CompositeProcess	  rdf:ID="ParallelFilter">	  
2 	  <rdfs:label>Parallel	  filter	  pattern</rdfs:label>	  
3 	  <p:hasResult><p:Result>	  
4 	  	   <p:inCondition	  rdf:resource="&expr;#AlwaysTrue"	  />	  
5 	  	   <p:withOutput><p:OutputBinding>	  
6 	  	   	  <p:toVar	  rdf:resource="#ProcessOutput"	  />	  
7 	  	   	  <p:valueSource><p:ValueOf>	  
8 	  	   	  	  <p:theVar	  rdf:resource="&aggreg;#Output_BF"	  />	  
9 	  	   	  	  <p:fromProcess	  rdf:resource="#PerformFilter"	  />	  
10 	  	   	  </p:ValueOf></p:valueSource>	  
11 	  	   </p:OutputBinding></p:withOutput>	  
12 	  </p:Result></p:hasResult>	  
13 	  <p:invocable	  rdf:datatype="&xsd;#boolean">	  
14 	  	   false	  
15 	  </p:invocable>	  
16 	  <p:composedOf><p:Sequence><p:components>	  
17 	  	   <p:Split-­‐Join	  rdf:parseType="Collection">	  
18 	  	   	  <p:Perform	  rdf:ID="Perform_A">	  
19 	  	   	  	  <p:process	  rdf:resource="#A"	  />	  
20 	  	   	  	  <p:hasDataFrom><p:InputBinding>	  
21 	  	   	  	  	   <p:toVar	  rdf:resource="#Input_A"	  />	  
22 	  	   	  	  	   <p:valueSource><p:ValueOf>	  
23 	  	   	  	  	   	  <p:theVar	  rdf:resource="#ProcessInput"	  />	  
24 	  	   	  	  	   	  <p:fromProcess	  	  
	   rdf:resource="&p;#TheParentPerform"	  />	  
25 	  	   	  	  	   </p:ValueOf></p:valueSource>	  
26 	  	   	  	  </p:InputBinding></p:hasDataFrom>	  
27 	  	   	  </p:Perform>	  
28 	  	   	  <p:Perform	  rdf:ID="Perform_B">	  
29 	  	   	  	  <p:process	  rdf:resource="#B"	  />	  
30 	  	   	  	  <p:hasDataFrom><p:InputBinding>	  
31 	  	   	  	  	   <p:toVar	  rdf:resource="#Input_B"	  />	  
32 	  	   	  	  	   <p:valueSource><p:ValueOf>	  
33 	  	   	  	  	   	  <p:theVar	  rdf:resource="#ProcessInput"	  />	  
34 	  	   	  	  	   	  <p:fromProcess	  	  
	   rdf:resource="&p;#TheParentPerform"	  />	  
35 	  	   	  	  	   </p:ValueOf></p:valueSource>	  
36 	  	   	  	  </p:InputBinding></p:hasDataFrom>	  
37 	  	   	  </p:Perform>	  
38 	  	   </p:Split-­‐Join>	  
39 	  	   <p:Perform	  rdf:ID="PerformFilter">	  
40 	  	   	  <p:process	  rdf:resource="&aggreg;#BasicFilter"	  />	  
41 	  	   	  <p:hasDataFrom><p:InputBinding>	  
42 	  	   	  	  <p:toVar	  
	   rdf:resource="&aggreg;#ListToFilter"	  />	  
43 	  	   	  	  <p:valueSource><p:ValueOf>	  
44 	  	   	  	  	   <p:theVar	  rdf:resource="#Output_A"	  />	  
45 	  	   	  	  	   <p:fromProcess	  rdf:resource="#Perform_A"	  />	  
46 	  	   	  	  </p:ValueOf></p:valueSource>	  
47 	  	   	  </p:InputBinding><p:InputBinding>	  
48 	  	   	  	  <p:toVar	  
	   rdf:resource="&aggreg;#ValueToFilter"	  />	  
49 	  	   	  	  <p:valueSource><p:ValueOf>	  
50 	  	   	  	  	   <p:theVar	  rdf:resource="#Output_B"	  />	  
51 	  	   	  	  	   <p:fromProcess	  rdf:resource="#Perform_B"	  />	  
52 	  	   	  	  </p:ValueOf></p:valueSource>	  
53 	  	   	  </p:InputBinding></p:hasDataFrom>	  
54 	  	   </p:Perform>	  
55 	  </p:components></p:Sequence></p:composedOf>	  
56 </p:CompositeProcess> 
 
V. SECURITY PROPERTIES 
Security properties are represented in our approach as 
relations on service operations and, in some cases, on the data 
TABLE III 
TEMPLATE FOR XSLT BASICFILTER  
<stylesheet	  version="2.0"	  
	  	  	  	  xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">	  
<template	  match="@*|node()">	  
	  	  <copy><apply-­‐templates	  select="@*|node()"/></copy>	  
</template>	  
<template	  match="{$basicType}">	  
	  	  <if	  test="{$attribute}	  =	  {$valueToFilter}">	  
	  	  	  	  <copy><apply-­‐templates	  select="@*|node()"/></copy>	  
	  	  </if>	  
</template>	  
</stylesheet> 
 
 
exchanged by them (i.e., the input, output and persistent 
internal service data). These relations are expressed as 
properties in the form <relation>(<operation>, <data>). The 
relation that expresses the confidentiality of the customer detail 
CustData of getStockHeadlines inputs, for example, is: 
Confidentiality(CustData, getStockHeadlines). 
A security property P is guaranteed by a service S if S can 
provide a certificate from an appropriate certification authority 
containing P. To be able to guarantee a security property in a 
composition, it may be necessary to check and propagate 
different properties. In particular, when there is some data 
involved in a security property, any action that an activity may 
perform on the secure data may lead to the need to check 
further properties.  
To ensure the confidentiality of some input data, for 
example, it is necessary to ensure both the confidentiality of 
data transmission and storage confidentiality. The 
confidentiality in transmission is required on the input of an 
activity. However, if the output of the same activity also 
discloses any kind of information about the input, to preserve 
confidentiality the output should be transmitted confidentially 
as well. In a similar manner, if data that can disclose 
information about the input is stored, the confidentiality of 
storage should be assured. Such properties can be provided by 
some encryption mechanism, or by a certified property that the 
output/stored data doesn’t disclose any information about the 
input (or that no data is being stored). Thus, the ability of a 
composition to guarantee security properties depends on the 
certified actions that the individual services perform. Such 
dependencies between security properties and service actions 
are expressed by security implication rules.  
Back to the confidentiality example, suppose that we have 
some data D used in an activity A as input or output. A 
security implication rule can express that D should be 
transmitted confidentially, if it is derived from some data D’ 
that are confidential for some activity A’, or otherwise it must 
be certified that D does not disclose information about D’. 
This can be specified by a rule (Rule-1) stating that if some 
data D’, which is required to be confidential during 
transmission for an activity A’, is used as input of another 
activity A, then the output of A should be confidential on 
transmission as well or there should be a certificate verifying 
that A does not disclose information about its input D’. 
The security implication rules should be formally proven 
offline before used in our approach. This is required because 
 the process of constructing rules at runtime, or of deriving 
dependencies between security properties of services, is 
computationally expensive. The process of constructing proofs 
of security implication rules is beyond the scope of this paper 
but interested readers may find examples of such proofs in [4]. 
The security implication rules are specified in Situation 
Calculus (SC) [5]1. SC is a first order logic language that 
supports specifications and reasoning for domains that change 
dynamically. SC uses predicates called “fluents” that describe 
the state of a domain. Fluents are evaluated against sequences 
of actions, called “situations”. In the SC model of the security 
implication rules we use: 
• the fluent next(A,A’) to specify that an activity A is 
followed by an activity A’ in the workflow of a pattern 
• the fluent input(A,D) (output(A,D)) to specify that D is an 
input (output) of activity A 
• the fluent known(P, S) to specify that the security property 
P is already known to be satisfied (certified) in situation S 
• the property confT(A,D) to specify that there is a certificate 
for action A stating that data D is confidential on 
transmission 
• the property deriveND(D, D’) to specify that data D is 
derived from D’ and there is a certificate stating that D 
doesn’t disclose any information about D’. 
The control and data flows of workflows created from 
patterns, and descriptions of the services that instantiate the 
activities in them are also mapped in SC as initial fluents for 
the security implication rules. Furthermore, we represent the 
traces of the workflow as situations, where currAct(A) is the 
fluent describing that the reasoning step is on activity A. The 
reasoner navigates stepwise the workflow and, at each step, it 
collects the required security properties, expressed by the 
fluent requires(P, S). 
TABLE IV 
EXAMPLE OF A SECURITY IMPLICATION RULE (RULE-1) 
PRECONDITION AXIOMS 
poss(step(A),S)↔ currAct(A’,S) ∧ next(A,A’) 
SUCCESSOR STATE 
currAct(A,do(α,S))↔ α = step(A) 
requires(confT(A,D),do(α,S))↔[α = step(A) ∧ output(A,D) ∧ input(A,D’) 
∧ known(confT(A’,D’), S) ∧ known(deriveND(D’,D)) ∧ A’ ≠ A] 
∨ [α ≠ step(A) ∧ requires(confT (A,D), S)] 
Table IV shows the specification of the security implication 
rule Rule-1 that we introduce above in SC. The first two 
formulae in the table are common rules enabling the SC 
reasoner to take into account one step at time. The actual 
formula for Rule-1 is the third formula (the only difference 
from the previous explanation is the disjunctive condition in 
the formula, which is required to solve the “frame problem” in 
SC). 
The instantiation of the activities in a composition pattern is 
based not only on the IO dependencies of the pattern but also 
on security properties. The security conditions are inferred 
from: (a) the security conditions of the query, (b) the security 
                                                            
1 We don’t use the markup rule language for OWL (Semantic Web Rule 
Language, SWRL) to specify the security implication rules because of the 
limitation of this language wrt its decidability [23]. 
properties that the already instantiated services provide, and (c) 
the security implication rules. The rules provide a list of the 
security properties that must be certified for the single 
activities to satisfy the given security property for the whole 
composition.  
VI. COMPOSITION PROCESS  
Service compositions are obtained by constructing 
workflows through a step-wise instantiation of the composition 
patterns. When no single replacement service is found for a 
service S that needs to be discovered, then the discovery query 
that is associated with the service to be replaced (QS) is sent to 
the Composition Algorithm shown in Table V.  
TABLE V 
COMPOSITION ALGORITHM 
Algorithm: SecureComposition(QS) 
Input: QS query for required service  
Output: WFSet – set of instantiated workflows 
 
1 for each pattern Patt such that applicable(Patt, QS)=true do 
2 Create the workflow WF* from Patt and put it in WFQueue 
3 while there are more workflows in WFQueue do 
4 Get the first WF in the WFQueue 
5 Take an unassigned activity α in the WF 
6 Build a query Q* for α from: 
  the IO dependencies of Patt 
  the conditions inferred by the SecRules 
  any instantiated part of Patt and QS 
7 Res = execute single service discovery of query Q*  
8 if Res = ø then 
9  Res = SecureComposition(α,Q*) 
10 endif 
11 Res’ = filter Res based on SecRules on the security properties 
guaranteed by each candidate service 
12 for service S* in Res’ do 
13  WFS* = WF[α \ S*] //substitute S* for α in the workflow 
14  if there is another unassigned activity in WFS* then 
15  Put WFS* in WFQueue 
16  else 
17  Add WFS* to WFSet 
18  endif 
19 end 
20 end 
21 end 
22 Return WFSet 
Initially the algorithm identifies the applicable patterns 
based on the applicability conditions expressed in them. For 
each of the patterns that are applicable the algorithm attempts 
to build a workflow by instantiating the activities of the 
pattern. In particular, each activity in a pattern can be bounded 
to a single service or, if no single services are found, to a 
service composition generated recursively by the same process. 
To instantiate an activity in a pattern, the algorithm builds a 
query Q* based on the specification of the pattern and the input 
service discovery query QS. Q* includes any IO dependencies 
that have been specified in the pattern and security conditions 
inferred by the security implication rules. The list of the 
candidate services obtained by executing the query that is 
constructed on-fly is then refined by analyzing the security 
conditions thanks to the additional inferences that the security 
implication rules can provide. 
Consider, for example, the case where the confidentiality on 
 transmission of the input IN is required when the SSP pattern 
is applied. If a candidate service S for the activity A in the 
pattern is found, then S should already provide the requested 
security conditions for its input inA as evidenced through a 
certificate of S. 
For the output data outA, however, there are three cases: (i) S 
has a certificate that guarantees the confidentiality of the 
transmission of outA, (ii) S has a certificate that guarantees that 
outA doesn’t disclose any information about IN, or (iii) S 
doesn’t have any of the two certificates descripted in (i) and 
(ii). The first two cases guarantee the confidentiality of IN but 
the third doesn’t, and, if this is the case, S will be discarded 
from the list of candidate services.  
Furthermore, if a confidentiality on storage, then S should 
provide a certificate stating either that: (i) all the stored data 
comply with the confidentiality on storage requirement, (ii) all 
the stored data doesn’t disclose any information about IN or 
(iii) there’s no data stored from the service. If none of these 
certificates is provided, then S would not be a valid candidate. 
D. Example 
As an example of applying the algorithm of Table V 
consider the scenario introduced in Sect. II. In this scenario 
suppose that the original service getStockHeadlines becomes 
unavailable and thus it becomes necessary to find a 
replacement for it. As, however, no single replacement service 
can be located, it becomes necessary to attempt to find a secure 
composition of different services. 
An applicable pattern in this scenario is the SPFP (Fig. 
5(b)), since it can filter arrays and it provides the required 
confidentiality for the stock Symbol and customer details 
CustData given as input. The query QA to instantiate the first 
activity (A in Fig. 5) of this pattern requires a service whose 
input is a subset of {Symbol, CustData} and output a subtype 
of StockNews[] containing at least the news related to the 
Symbol (this last condition is the difference from the query for 
S1). Furthermore the query contains the confidentiality 
conditions about Symbol and CustData, which are specified by 
the original query.  
 
Fig. 5.  Example of a complex workflow obtained through the recursive 
application of composition patterns. 
 
The alternative service, S2, doesn’t match the query, so the 
algorithm is called recursively to find a composition satisfying 
the query. A pattern that guarantees the security condition is 
the SSP (Fig. 5(c)). The query for the last activity (D in Fig. 5) 
of this pattern is similar to QA, except that it no longer 
incorporates any condition about the input.  
In this case the query matches the operation 
fetchNewsHeadlines from S2 that provides an array of all the 
MarketNews from a PaymToken. Up to this point, no security 
conditions are involved.  
After this instantiation, the query for the remaining activity 
of the SSP (C in Fig. 5) is built. This query requires a service 
that can derive the missing data. Thus, it requires a service that 
given a subset of {Symbol, CustData}, returns a payment token 
PaymToken, and would satisfy the security conditions about 
Symbol and CustData confidentiality. An operation that 
matches this query is the Payment from S2. This operation 
consumes the CustData input and it guarantees confidentiality 
for this data. Since this input is confidential, then the security 
implication rules require that each output must be certified 
unrelated to the input or confidential as well. In this case 
PaymToken is confidential, so this new requirement is checked 
also against the already instantiated activities. In particular 
fetchNewsHeadlines must guarantee confidentiality on 
PaymToken too, otherwise the instantiation of Payment in C 
can’t take place and the algorithm discards this operation from 
the candidate operations. 
After C is instantiated, the workflow for the SSP is 
complete, so the recursion is done and this sub-composition 
instantiates the first activity A of the SPFP. At this point the 
output of A is a subtype of StockNews[] that provides the 
additional attribute ISIN and that can contain also news not 
related with the requested stock. 
The query for the second activity of the Parallel Filter 
pattern (B in Fig. 5) requires a service whose input is a subset 
of {Symbol, CustData}. The filter activity also requires that the 
output of B is a subtype of the ID needed to filter the news for 
the requested stock, in this case the ISIN. The query also 
contains the security conditions about Symbol and CustData 
being confidential.  
A service that offers the operation getStockDetails is found. 
Given a Symbol, this service returns the StockDetails, which 
also contain ISIN. Since this service uses Symbol, it must 
comply with the security condition related to it thus, it must 
provide confidentiality for Symbol. The security inference rules 
are then used to check if there are other security conditions that 
are derived from the requested condition. Since the Symbol of a 
stock should remain confidential, then all the data that can give 
information about it should be confidential as well. The 
outputs of this service, then, should have a certified property of 
not being related to the Symbol or being confidential as well. In 
our case the StockDetails are related to the Symbol so this 
output needs to be confidential as well. Furthermore, the final 
filtered news can give out information about the searched stock 
through the ISIN attribute, so the output of the composition 
must be confidential as well. 
VII. RELATED WORK  
Research dealing with security in service composition has 
focused on the verification of the security of existing 
compositions through model checking [6][7][8]. Our focus, 
 however, is different since we are looking into applying 
composition patterns and security implication rules that are 
proven to guarantee security properties as part of a runtime 
service discovery and composition process. 
A work that is more related to ours is [9], where planning 
techniques are used to compose workflows that are compliant 
with some lattice-based access control models (e.g. multi-level 
secure systems). The focus of [9] is how to find efficient 
algorithms for sequential workflow planning whilst our 
approach is more general w.r.t both the types of workflows and 
the security properties that it covers. 
In [10] the authors describe an approach to security 
conscious web service composition through matching security 
constraints required for service provision and constraints 
declared by service providers. The security constraints in this 
approach are specified in SAML [11]. In [10], secure service 
compositions are generated based upon some pre-defined 
domain specific business workflows, whilst our approach 
allows the generation of arbitrary workflows. 
Other works on automatic service composition (e.g. 
[2][12][13][14]) allow the expression of security properties in 
discovery queries, usually as non-functional properties. These 
approaches focus on specific types of security properties and 
check them only against single services in compositions, 
without addressing the overall security of a composition. 
In literature [15][17][18][19], the security patterns are 
usually defined as design patterns that guarantee some security 
goal. These patterns are used to secure software during the 
design and develop phase, which are usually human based. Our 
approach, instead, is to dynamically compose services while 
assuring security properties; this requires automated processing 
of the patterns during the integration of the services. 
Finally, our secure service composition patterns are similar 
to the workflow patterns in [3] as they specify elementary 
workflows that can be used to generate service compositions. 
However, our patterns include additional data flow and 
applicability specifications. In particular some of them also 
include some data transformation activities.  
VIII. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we have presented an approach that supports 
the generation of secure compositions of services, as part of 
runtime service discovery. Our approach is based on 
composition patterns and security implication rules to 
determine the security properties that need to be satisfied by 
the individual services that participate in a composition in 
order for the composition to satisfy global security properties. 
The patterns are specified in OWL-S and describe the flows of 
control and data within a workflow as well as preconditions 
determining when a pattern can be applied. The security 
implication rules are specified in Situation Calculus and 
express the consequences that, particular actions of individual 
services and service compositions, have on security properties. 
Service compositions are built through a stepwise and 
possibly recursive instantiation of patterns based on an 
algorithm that we have introduced in the paper. In this process, 
the logical connections between service and composition level 
security properties are determined by reasoning based on the 
security implication rules.  
Currently, we are investigating the use of composition 
patterns that are more complex than primitive service 
workflows, and focus on an experimental evaluation of our 
approach.  
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